Derivative Immunity: An Unjustifiable Bar to Section 1983 Actions by Merkle, Craig B.
DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY: AN UNJUSTIFIABLE
BAR TO SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Section 19831 provides a federal remedy for certain violations of
constitutionally protected rights. To state a cause of action under sec-
tion 1983, a complaint must allege that a "person" deprived the com-
plainant of a constitutionally protected right, and that that person acted
"under color" of state law.2 Purely private wrongful conduct is not
subject to action under section 1983, although that provision does apply
to private action that is related to state action of some kind.3 In United
States v. Price,4 the Supreme Court left no doubt about the liability
under section 1983 of private persons who conspire with state officials
to deprive another person of his constitutional rights. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Fortas stated that
[p]rivate persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited
action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute.
To act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
C. WRIGHT -& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969) [hereinafter cited as
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER];
Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation 4fer Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Schnapper];
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Developments in the Law];
Note, "Vcarious Immunimy" of Private Persons in Section 1983 ,4ctions: "An UnexaminedAs-
sumption," 28 CASE W.L. REv. 1014 (1978) [hereinafter cited as "Vicarious Ihnmuniy'1.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13).
2. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
3. Constitutional standards are applied to private action when the government supports it or
when private defendants "have assumed government powers or functions even without formal
government involvement." Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 659 (1974). The scope of this Comment is limited to
cases in which the state action requirement of section 1983 is satisfied by a conspiracy between
private parties and state officials. It will not examine those cases in which the private individual
has assumed some governmental function, nor will it consider private conspiracies reached under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976), which do not require state action. In the seminal case of Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Supreme Court held that "there must be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-
tion," id. at 102, before a cause of action can be established under section 1985(c).
4. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY
officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in
joint activity with the state or its agents.5
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that private persons
who conspire with state officials acting beyond their authority are liable
to suit under section 1983,6 it has not taken a position on the liability of
private individuals conspiring with public officials who are immune
from suit.7 Several of the courts of appeals, however, have adopted a
doctrine of "derivative" or "vicarious" immunity in such cases.8 Sim-
ply stated, this doctrine posits that "[p]rivate persons cannot be held
liable for conspiracy under [section 1983] if the other conspirators are
state officials who are themselves immune to liability under the facts
alleged." 9 In other words, the immunity of the public official extends
vicariously to the private party co-conspirator, thus insulating the pri-
vate party from suit under section 1983. A plaintiff in such situations is
completely deprived of his section 1983 action for damages.
A thorough analysis of the doctrine of derivative immunity dem-
onstrates numerous failings. The doctrine arose as an arguably unjusti-
5. Id. at 794 (footnote omitted). Although Price was a criminal prosecution involving 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1976), the Supreme Court had previously held that its construction of "under color
of law" was identical for section 242 and section 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961),
overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
Section 242 is the criminal counterpart to section 1983. It provides that anyone who, under color
of any law, deprives an inhabitant of any state, territory, or district of a constitutionally protected
right may be subject to a fine of up to $1000 or a prison sentence of up to one year, or both. If
death results, as was the case in Price, any term of years may be imposed. In Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), a section 1983 case, the Court held that "[a]ny notion that a
private person is necessarily immune from liability under § 1983 because of the 'under color of'
requirements of the statute was put to rest by our holding in United States v. Price. Id. at
174 n.44 (emphasis in original).
6. In Price, three local police officers allegedly conspired with 15 private defendants to mur-
der three civil rights workers by releasing them from jail, transporting them to a deserted dirt
road, and eventually killing them as they made their "escape." 383 U.S. at 790. The police of-
ficers were apparently acting beyond their authority. Therefore, the 15 private defendants were
indictable.
A section 1983 cause of action cannot be based on conspiracy alone. Lesser v. Braniff Air-
ways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975). For instance, section 1983 does not provide a
cause of action for "conspiracy to deny due process." Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153, 154 (7th
Cir. 1954). "[Alctual denial of due process [is required] before a cause arises." Id. The conspir-
acy issue, which this Comment addresses, only serves to satisfy the under color of state law re-
quirement of section 1983. Although not dealt with specifically in this Comment, a deprivation of
a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution is also necessary before a cause of
action under section 1983 will arise. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
7. The facts in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), did bring this issue before the
Court. Because it was not the issue raised or presented on appeal, however, the Supreme Court
refused to decide it, although the Court did note the conflicting positions among the circuits. Id.
at 364 n.13.
8. See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
9. Skyes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
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fled extension of the personal and municipal immunities developed by
the Supreme Court to insulate certain defendants in section 1983 ac-
tions. Moreover, many courts may apply the doctrine because they are
unable to differentiate between the concepts of "state action" and "im-
munity." Finally, the application of the doctrine is arbitrary because
mere fortuity determines whether a private defendant will reap the
benefits of this defense. The critical inquiry under the doctrine is
whether the constitutional deprivation involved the action of an im-
mune public official; the actions of the private party defendant play no
part in triggering the defense.
This Comment will argue that a general doctrine of derivative im-
munity (also called "vicarious" or "per se" immunity) is unjustifiable.
Initially, the Comment will discuss the development of the doctrine
and its current status in the federal courts. Second, it will present the
trends and standards over the past twenty years for section 1983 gov-
ernmental immunities. The doctrine of derivative immunity will be
evaluated against this backdrop and the arguments against the doctrine
will be developed. Special attention will be paid to a proposal for
avoiding the derivative immunity issue suggested by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in the recent case of Sparkman v. MeFar-
lin.10 Next, this Comment will evaluate the First and Fifth Circuits'
rejection of the doctrine and their standard of liability under section
1983. Finally, it will propose an alternative that would establish a slid-
ing scale of liability for private defendants, depending upon whether
they acted with, in reliance on, or in obedience to public officials. A
variable standard, which attaches liability to the extent of the private
party's concerted action with public officials, may accommodate both
the intent of section 1983 and the standards of tort liability better than
the present doctrine of derivative immunity.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of derivative immunity was first enunciated in 1965
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Haldane v. Chagnon." I
The plaintiff in Haldane had been ordered by the judge in a prior di-
vorce proceeding to undergo a psychiatric examination.12 It was subse-
quently determined that the plaintiffs mental health did not require
treatment under hospital confinement. 13 In a suit for damages under
section 1983, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of several
10. 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (en banc).
11. 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965).
12. Id. at 602.
13. Id. at 602 n.2.
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constitutional rights. Named as defendants were the trial court judge,
the judge who had signed the order for the mental examination, and
two attorneys and a bailiff who had been involved in filing the petition
for the examination.' 4 The district court dismissed the case and the
plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. There the court had no trouble
finding the defendant judges and bailiff immune from section 1983 as
government officials.' 5 Moreover, the court ruled that the defendant
attorneys could not be liable either:
The attorneys were not State officers, and they did not act in conspir-
acy with a State officer against whom appellant could state a valid
claim. It follows that they did not and could not, commit the alleged
wrongful acts "under color of state law or authority"; hence, they are
not subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act.' 6
By holding that private parties are liable only if they act in conspiracy
with a state official "against whom [the aggrieved party] could state a
valid claim," the court extended the immunity of state officials to cover
private parties. The case neither elaborated nor justified this special
status of private parties, 17 and the language of section 1983 does not
suggest that it should exist.
Although the other courts of appeals did not adopt the doctrine of
derivative immunity immediately,' 8 the Third,' 9 Fifth,20 Sixth,2' and
Seventh 22 Circuits adopted it between 1970 and 1978. None of the cir-
cuits adopting the doctrine gave it a reasoned opinion; instead, each
14. Id. at 602.
15. Id. at 604.
16. Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added).
17. As support for its position, the court cited the following decisions: Skolnick v. Spolar,
317 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1963); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963); Bottone v.
Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949); Swift v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 563, 566 (M.D. Ga. 1962). See Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d at 605.
These cases do not deal with conspiracies between private parties and state officials. The allega-
tions of constitutional deprivation in these cases grew out of private litigation in state courts be-
tween the plaintiffs and defendants. The only involvement of the state was to provide a forum for
the private litigation from which the alleged deprivations emerged. If anything, these cases stand
only for the proposition that private attorneys, acting alone, do not act under color of state law.
18. Soon after Haldane, three district courts adopted the doctrine of derivative immunity.
See Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp.
200, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 505 (S.D. Cal. 1966). See gener-
ally "Vicarious Immunity" 1030-31.
19. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975).
20. Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1970). The Fifth Circuit has recently re-
versed its position on derivative immunity. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976,
978 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1339 (1980). See text accompanying notes
208-14 infra.
21. Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 972 (1977).
22. Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1975). The Seventh Circuit's current
position on derivative immunity is unclear. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (en banc). See notes 159-65 infra and accompanying text.
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court merely recited the doctrine as precedent with little further expla-
nation.23 Thus, precedent for the doctrine grew, and continues to grow,
without its ever having been justified fully by a circuit court decision.
The doctrine of derivative immunity is currently applied in three
circuits, 24 as well as four district courts outside those circuits.25 Only
the First Circuit has consistently rejected the concept.26 The Fifth2 7
and Tenth28 Circuits recently rejected the doctrine, however, and a re-
cent case in the Seventh Circuit indicates that the doctrine's validity is
uncertain in that jurisdiction. 29
It is obvious that the doctrine of derivative immunity is undergo-
ing a much overdue evaluation. The doctrine was developed by the
Ninth Circuit at a time when the Supreme Court was enunciating the
personal and municipal immunities to section 1983 actions.30 At that
time several circuit courts simply went a step further by extending the
23. E.g., Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d at 175; Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d at 770-71; Waits
v. McGowan, 516 F.2d at 205; Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d at 664.
24. The three circuits are the Ninth (Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 1977)),
the Sixth (Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d at 175), and the Third (Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d at
205). In Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir. 1977), however, the Third Circuit held
that a private citizen can be liable under section 1983 if he conspires with a state official, although
the court did not explicitly consider whether he would be liable if the state official were immune.
25. Gary v. Spires, 473 F. Supp. 878, 884 (D.S.C. 1979); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n,
467 F. Supp. 803, 811 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kane v. Graubard, 442 F. Supp. 733, 735 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (D.S.C. 1976); Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp. 450,
455-56 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp. 200, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Slotnick v.
Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 32 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1977); Kermit Constr. Corp. v.
Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). See notes 199-207 iqfra and
accompanying text.
27. In Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 139 (1980), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled the doctrine of derivative
immunity, which had been well established in the circuit by the following line of cases: Perez v.
Borchers, 567 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Humble v.
Foreman, 563 F.2d 780, 781 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859, 860 (5th
Cir. 1974); Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d at 664. See notes 209-14 infra and accompanying text.
28. Norton v. Liddel, No. 78-1712, slip op. at 7-8 (10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1980).
29. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (en banc). See notes
159-65 infra and accompanying text.
To date, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have not directly addressed the derivative
immunity doctrine. Although the Second Circuit has not expressly taken a position, the opinion
in Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975), seems to indicate that it would not
uphold the doctrine. In Fine, a private attorney was held to be liable to suit under section 1983
even though other attorneys joined as defendants in the suit were found to be immune. Id. at 73-
74. The court did not mention the possibility of derivative immunity, but instead stressed the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). See 529 F.2d at 73-75.
Section 1983 has no application in the District of Columbia Circuit. The Supreme Court has
determined that the District of Columbia is not a "state or territory" within the meaning of section
1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1973).
30. See notes 31-97 infra and accompanying text.
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immunities already given various governmental entities and officials to
private parties acting in concert with the immune officials. The critical
inquiry, however, should be whether the justifications and constitu-
tional standards for granting governmental immunity to section 1983
actions are applicable to private persons. If section 1983 immunities
are to be extended derivatively to private parties, this question must be
answered affirmatively.
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES UNDER SECTION 1983:
MUNICIPAL AND PERSONAL
Section 1983 renders every person who acts under color of state
law to deprive another of a constitutionally protected right liable to the
injured party in an action at law, equity, or other proceeding for re-
dress.31 The language of the statute speaks in terms of strict liability
without provision for viable defenses. 32 During the late nineteenth
century, however, the federal courts severely restricted the scope of the
statute by narrowly interpreting both the constitutional rights protected
by the statute and the meaning of "under color" of state law.33
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape34 in 1961,
the statute was rarely invoked.35 In Monroe the Court held applicable
to section 1983 the broad interpretation it had earlier given to "under
color of law" in 42 U.S.C. § 242,36 the criminal counterpart to section
1983. 37 The Court's subsequent expansive reading of both the due
process and equal protection clauses to encompass many constitution-
31. See note 2 supra.
32. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See note 207 infra.
33. Developments in the Law 1191. See generally id. 1156-61; "Vicarious Immunity" 1016-19.
34. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 663, 701 (1978).
35. See Developments in the Law 1161. Between 1871 and 1920, only 21 cases were brought
under section 1983. Comment, The CivilRights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Rem-
edy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). During this same period, only 15 Supreme Court cases in-
volved section 1983. "Vicarious Immunity" 1019 n.33. "As late as 1953, the statute was still
relatively ineffective." Developments in the Law 1161 n.139. See generally Note, The Proper Scope
of the Civil RightsAct, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1953).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) ("under
'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law"); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)
("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer
is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law"). See note 5
supra.
37. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 185 ("Under color of law" means the same thing in section
1983 as it does in section 242). "In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been
treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. at 794 n.7.
Vol. 1980:568]
DUKE LAW JO UNAAL
ally protected rights38 has caused the number of section 1983 suits to
increase dramatically in recent years.39 In the last two decades, how-
ever, the federal judiciary has shifted its attention away from the
problems of protecting private rights and finding the requisite state ac-
tion and toward the other components of the section 1983 prima facie
case.40 The courts have narrowed the range of parties that are poten-
tially liable under section 1983 by restricting the definition of the term
"person" in the statute4' and by developing personal immunities for
certain state officials. These limitations served as the setting for the
development of the doctrine of derivative immunity. More important,
they provide the benchmark by which the doctrine should be evalu-
ated.
A. Absolute and Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983.
On its face, section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that...
admits of no immunities .... -42 The Supreme Court has therefore
provided a shield from damages under the statute for state legislators,
judges, and prosecutors, as long as they have acted within their official
capacities. In Tenney v. Brandhove,43 the Supreme Court held that leg-
38. "Vicarious Immunity" 1020.
39. In fiscal 1960, fewer than 300 private civil rights cases (cases in which the United States
was not a party) were commenced in federal district court, accounting for 0.5% of the total civil
workload. 1960 AD. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, DIRECTOR's ANN. REP. 232, table C 2. By 1972 that
number had risen to approximately 8,800 and constituted 9.2% of the civil caseload. 1972 AD.
OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, DIRECTOR'S ANN. REP. 286-87, table C 2. In fiscal 1979 nearly 23,000
private civil rights actions were commenced in federal court, accounting for 14.7% of the civil
caseload. 1979 AD. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, DIRECTOR's ANN. REP., at A-14 to -15, table C 2.
Prisoner petitions have been the biggest cause of this increase, with 3,300 and 11,200 claims being
commenced in 1972 and 1979 respectively. 1972 ANN. REP., supra at 287, table C 2; 1979 ANN.
REP. supra at A-15, table C 2. One authority estimates that almost one-third of the nearly 57,000
private federal question cases filed in the federal district courts in 1976 were civil rights actions
asserting constitutional claims against state and local officials. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149
(2d ed. Supp. 1977).
40. Developments in the Law 1191. Modem federal courts have used three means to limit the
scope of section 1983: "the restrictive definition of the type of 'person' suable under the statute;
the development of state of mind requirements requisite to a finding of liability; and the creation
of limits on the availability of effective relief once liability has been found." Id. This Comment
will discuss only the limitations on the type of person amenable to suit and the state of mind
requirements as they relate to the doctrine of derivative immunity. While all three limitations
have had an impact on the development of law under section 1983, the relief limitation is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
41. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), this limitation has been relaxed, although the parameters of the Court's new
position have yet to be defined. See notes 83-93 infra and accompanying text.
42. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
43. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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islative immunity was so firmly established at common law44 and in
both the federal 45 and state46 constitutions that Congress would have
specifically provided for its abolition under section 1983 had it so in-
tended.47 Tenney established that section 1983 was to be read "in har-
mony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather
than in derogation of them."'48 This rationale was adopted by lower
courts to create an absolute immunity for judges under section 1983. 49
The Supreme Court approved this extension in Pierson v. Ray5° and
recently reaffirmed the principle of absolute immunity for state court
judges in Stump v. Sparkman.5 ' In Imbler v. Pachtman,52 the Court
provided state prosecutors absolute immunity for actions taken in con-
nection with "initiating a prosecution and . . presenting the State's
case."
5 3
The purpose of absolute immunity is to promote spirited public
service and to prevent fearful decisionmaking that would result if the
attention of judges, legislators, and prosecutors were diverted away
from public trust and toward personal liability.54 The Supreme Court
has "jealously guarded the protection accorded judges, legislators and
44. Id. at 372-76. The policy rationale for legislative immunity was, and remains, to protect
the heart of the democratic process.
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public
trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every
one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
Id. at 373 (quoting II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)).
45. 341 U.S. at 373; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (speech or debate clause).
46. At the time Tenney was decided, 41 of 48 states had "specific provisions in their Constitu-
tions protecting the privilege." 341 U.S. at 375.
47. Id. at 376.
48. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584-85, 586-87, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc).
50. 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). The Court relied heavily on the common law immunity
from damages liability accorded judges for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. Id at
553-54 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)). This absolute immunity was
founded on the fear that judges would be hounded by litigation charging malice or corruption and
that such a burden would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking, but to intimi-
dation. The immunity applies even when the judge is accused of malicious action and corruption.
386 U.S. at 554. The extension of section 1983 absolute immunity to judges has been severely
criticized. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-59 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Develop-
ments in the Law 1200-04.
51. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). A state judge will be subject to liability only when he has acted in
the "clear absence of all jurisdictions." Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)).
52. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
53. Id. at 431. As for judicial immunity, the policy rationales for prosecutorial immunity are
to avoid diverting the prosecutor's attention away from the public trust and toward personal lia-
bility and to facilitate efficient operation of the criminal justice process. Id. at 424-26.
54. See notes 44, 50, & 53 supra.
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prosecutors" 55 to date, but it has refused to grant absolute immunity to
any other state officials.56 Instead, the Court has extended qualified
immunity to section 1983 claims to a growing number of officials.
In Pierson v. Ray57 the Supreme Court recognized, for the first
time, the doctrine of qualified immunity.58 Dealing with the section
1983 liability of policemen, the Court held that a police officer's com-
mon law defense of good faith in the case of false arrest would also
apply to section 1983.59 The Court clarified its position in Scheuer v.
Rhodes60 and Wood v. Strickland.61 In Scheuer, the Court weighed the
competing public policies instead of unquestioningly adopting the com-
mon law immunity, as was done in Pierson. Balancing the need to pro-
tect state executive conduct with the objectives of section 1983, the
Court rejected the absolute immunity granted to executive officers at
common law and extended to them only a qualified immunity-a good
faith defense. 62
Scheuer evidenced the Supreme Court's unwillingness to extend
absolute immunity. The Court was also reluctant to establish a liberal
standard for good faith under the qualified immunity defense. In
Wood, the Court held that the good faith standard encompasses both a
subjective and an objective element. An official entitled to assert the
immunity will be subject to liability for damages under section 1983 "if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights ....
55. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
56. Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned additional absolute immunities, some
lower courts, relying on the trio of absolutes, have extended such immunity to other officials. See
Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (judicial clerks); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460
F.2d 1019, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972) (judicial clerks); Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836, 838 (6th Cir.
1972) (municipal referees and judicial officers) (dictum); Pennebaker v. Chamber, 437 F.2d 66, 67
(3d Cir. 1971) (justices of the peace); Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir.
1969) (parole board members). But cf. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4-5 (4th Cir. 1972) (act of
clerk purely ministerial and outside the protection afforded by the doctrine ofjudicial immunity).
57. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Pierson was also the case in which the Court recognized the absolute
immunity of state judges. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
58. The term "qualified immunity" is misleading. While absolute immunity will serve to
defeat an action from the outset, qualified immunity is a defense dependent upon the circum-
stances and motivations of the defendant's actions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419
n.13 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1974).
59. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 557.
60. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
61. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
62. 416 U.S. at 242-48; see "Vicarious Immunity" 1025.
63. 420 U.S. at 322.
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Since 1967 the Supreme Court has held that the good faith de-
fense, in section 1983 actions, applies to policemen,64 governors, 65 uni-
versity presidents,66 officers and members of national guards, 67 school
board members,68 superintendents of mental hospitals,69 and prison of-
ficials.70 In addition, the courts of appeals have not hesitated to extend
qualified immunity to a variety of other officials, including parole of-
ficers,7 1 jailers,72 and state banking officials.73 Although the category of
officials held to be immune under section 1983 has expanded, the trend
has been to limit the scope of this immunity. The Supreme Court's
approach to qualified immunity has been to examine the legislative in-
tent of the statute, the immunity accorded at common law, and the pol-
icy considerations that support the concept of immunity before
extending it to a section 1983 defendant. 74 This analysis, however, was
lacking in the development of the derivative immunity doctrine. In
fact, these factors militate against extending immunity derivatively to
private defendants in section 1983 actions.75
This discussion of qualified immunity has delineated the standards
under which an extension of immunity is appropriate and has illus-
trated the dwindling number of potential defendants for a section 1983
suit. Qualified immunity, however, does not appear to be an appropri-
ate springboard for the extension of derivative immunity to private per-
sons. Although the circuits adopting derivative immunity have not
expressly so indicated,76 the doctrine can operate only when the private
defendant conspired with a public official who is absolutely immune.
Absolute immunity bars an action from the outset. While qualified im-
munity is a defense, its viability depends upon the circumstances and
64. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
65. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-43, 247-50 (1974).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
69. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975).
70. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978).
71. Wolfel v. Sanborn, 555 F.2d 583, 591 (6th Cir. 1977).
72. Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1213-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976).
73. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 540 F.2d 948, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1976).
74. See "Vicarious Immunity" 1024-26.
75. See notes 98-136 infra and accompanying text.
76. The First Circuit's opinion in Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 910 (1978), contributes to the confusion on this point. In Downs, the public officials involved
in the alleged conspiracy were subject to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. The First
Circuit, in maintaining its consistent position against derivative immunity, refused to extend im-
munity derivatively to the private defendants. 574 F.2d at 15. Thus, the court was taking the
opportunity to reject the doctrine in a case in which it could not arise anyway.
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motivations of the official's actions.77 If the official covered by quali-
fied immunity has participated in a conspiracy, his action cannot rea-
sonably be characterized as being in good faith and he cannot claim
immunity. If the official has no immunity, then the private defendant
with whom he conspired can have no derivative immunity.78 If the
public official has acted in good faith, he cannot have been party to a
conspiracy. The public official who is cloaked with absolute immunity,
however, will maintain his immunity regardless of his lack of good
faith or conspiratorial motive.79
B. Municpal Liability Under Section 1983.
While the Supreme Court gave section 1983 a shot in the arm in
Monroe v. Pape8" by construing the "under color of law" requirement
broadly, the Court also, in the same case, severely limited the number
of potential defendants. In Monroe, the Court held that cities and mu-
nicipal corporations were not "persons" liable to suit under section
1983.81 This municipal immunity, combined with the expanding no-
tion of official immunity and the eventual creation of derivative immu-
77. See note 58 supra.
78. Thus, as formulated, the doctrine of derivative immunity would never be triggered. The
private defendant would have acted with a public official against whom the plaintiff could state a
valid claim. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
79. For instance, the only constraint on a judge is that he must not act in a clear absence of
jurisdiction. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979), illustrates the operation of
qualified immunity in a conspiracy setting. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that bank officials
arranged to have her arrested for failure to pay a parking ticket. She was held at the police station
after paying her fine and was not released until she talked to a bank officer. The court found that
the bank officer instilled fear in the plaintiff so that she would give the bank a preferred position in
relation to her other creditors. Id. at 607. The court upheld the sufficiency of the complaint
against the policeman and the bank official. Although policemen are subject to qualified immu-
nity, see text accompanying notes 57-59 supra, the court held that the police officer would be liable
under section 1983 if he arrested plaintiff "for an improper purpose." 591 F.2d at 611. If the
police officer had conspired with the bank official, he could not have acted in good faith and could
not be immune. Thus the issue of derivative immunity for the bank official did not arise.
In Norton v. Liddel, No. 78-1712 (10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1980), the issue of derivative immunity
did arise in the Tenth Circuit and the court rejected the concept, thus contributing to the recent
trend against it. Importantly, the court maintained its consistent distinction between absolute and
qualified immunity. The private defendant in Norton was a local sheriff who was alleged to have
conspired with the district attorney. Under the official immunities developed by the Supreme
Court, see notes 42-73 supra and accompanying text, prosecutors are covered by absolute immu-
nity while police officers only enjoy qualified immunity. Thus, the Norton court held that if the
sheriff had actively conspired with the prosecutor he would be liable under section 1983 since he
would have breached his duty of good faith required by the derivative immunity defense. Norton
v. Liddel, No. 78-1712, slip op. at 7, 11. The prosecutor would not be liable regardless of his good
faith or lack thereof due to the absolute nature of his immunity.
80. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 663, 701 (1978).
81. 365 U.S. at 187.
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nity for private defendants, greatly diminished the usefulness of the
section 1983 action. 82
The Supreme Court made a stark reversal in Monell v. Department
of Social Services83 by expressly overruling Monroe84 and its progeny85
insofar as they held local governments wholly immune from suit under
section 1983. Relying solely upon legislative history, as it had done in
Monroe,86 the Court held that a reexamination of the history of section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now codified in section 1983) com-
pelled the conclusion that "Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those persons to
whom 1983 applies."' 87 Although Monell might ameliorate the plight of
many justified plaintiffs, the case nevertheless fails to spell out the exact
requirements for municipal liability.88 Thus, the Court has left the ini-
82. The combined effect of these factors rendered section 1983 ineffective as a deterrent and
led many commentators to call for a reappraisal of Monroe. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, Liability of
Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 134-36 (1972);
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1974).
Between 1973 and 1976, in response to growing confusion among the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court attempted to delineate the parameters of Monroe. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (a city is not a "person" for section 1983 purposes even if only equitable
relief is sought); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 700-02 (1973) (counties, as subdivi-
sions of the state, are immune from section 1983 suits). For a general discussion of these cases, see
Note, Civil Rights: Discarding Section 1983 Afunicpal Immunity-Is That Enough?, 30 U. FLA. L.
REV. 979, 982-86 (1978).
83. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84. Id. at 663.
85. See Schnapper 264 ("Clearly Afonell destroys the basis of. . . loor").
86. See 365 U.S. at 187-92.
87. 436 U.S. at 690 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court, however, was quick
to point out that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant
to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id. at 691.
88. See Schnapper 216; Note, The Emergence of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.SC. § 1983,
8 CAP. U.L. REv. 103, 110-13 (1978). Two major types of section 1983 cases make defining munic-
ipal liability very difficult. First, there are cases founded on some official policy, standard, or
custom of local government. Monell itself is such a case, stemming from the written regulations of
two city departments dealing with maternity policy. 436 U.S. at 661. The case contains several
vague and differing descriptions of what is required for section 1983 liability: (a) "a policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulted by [the municipality's]
officers," id. at 694, (b) an action or policy that has "received formal approval through the body's
official decisionmaking channels," id. at 691, or (c) an action or policy "made by its law makers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy," id. at 694. See
Schnapper 216.
Second, there are cases involving acts of one or more city employees that result in depriving
another of a constitutional right. These cases have come to be known as "constitutional tort"
cases. Note, supra, at 112. The Court in lonell concluded that "a municipality cannot be held
liable solel, because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 436 U.S. at 691. The remaining problem is
determining the additional elements, aside from respondeat superior, needed to establish munici-
pal liability in these cases. For a good discussion of this point, see Scbnapper 265-66 ("if state or
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tial resolution of the contours of municipal liability, like the question of
derivative immunity for private persons, 89 to the lower federal courts.90
The overriding importance of Monell is found in the position that
the Supreme Court has taken on the purpose and scope of section 1983.
Monell evidences a trend away from prior judicial limitations on sec-
tion 1983 actions and toward increased recovery under the statute.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "there can be
no doubt that [section 1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to be
broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights." 9' In addition, the Court declined the opportunity to
extend official immunity to local government bodies. The brief com-
ments on immunity in Monell addressed limitation only, and not exten-
sion: "We express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be en-
titled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that such bodies are
subject to suit under § 1983 'be drained of meaning.' "92
The importance of Monell extends beyond the limited circum-
stances of municipal liability and immunity. As one commentator has
noted:
The practical importance of other decisions such as those providing
absolute immunity for judges, prosecutors, and legislators, and quali-
fied immunity for executive officials, turned on Monroe .... Thus,
the foundation of many of these procedural and remedial rules was
destroyed in June 1978 when the Supreme Court overruled Monroe
in Monell v. Department of Social Services.93
Clearly, the Court's new emphasis in Monell weakens the basis of the
derivative immunity doctrine as well.
local law imposes tort liability on a government body according to the principles of respondeat
superior, those principles should be applied under section 1988 in a section 1983 action"). Contra,
Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("state vicarious liability doc-
trines are inapplicable to § 1983 suits"). Even when only respondeat superior can be shown in
these "constitutional tort" cases, Monell does not say that the individual (employee) tortfeasor will
be personally immune from suit. A cause of action will exist against him.
89. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
90. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 713-14.
91. Id. at 700-01.
92. Id. at 701.
Recently, in Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980), the Supreme Court an-
swered the the immunity question left open in Monell, holding that in section 1983 suits for dam-
ages, municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity based on the good faith of their
officials. In so holding, the Court applied the same method of analysis that is discussed in this
Comment. It examined the language of section 1983, the legislative intent of the statute, the im-
munity accorded at common law, and the policy considerations that support the concept of immu-
nity. See text accompanying note 74 supra. The Court found that none of these considerations
support the extension of qualified immunity to municipalities. d. at 1415-16.
93. Schnapper 213-14 (footnotes omitted).
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The judicial interpretation of governmental immunities under sec-
tion 1983 reveals strong competing interests in the law. As the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has appraised:
On the one hand there is the public interest in vindicating individual
rights sought to be protected by the Civil Rights Act. On the other
hand, there exists a strong public policy in promoting spirited service
by public servants, a goal thought to be placed in jeopardy by the
threat of private damage suits for official actions.94
The Supreme Court has adopted the position that section 1983 immu-
nities must be "predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immu-
nity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the
interests behind it."95 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not in-
quired into the liability of private parties who conspire with immune
public officials, and the lower courts that have established the doctrine
of derivative immunity have failed to seek historic justifications for
their actions.96 In light of the Monell decision and its implications97
and the growth of qualified government immunities, the time is ripe for
a reexamination in the federal courts of the doctrine of derivative im-
munity.
III. THE PER SE RULE OF DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY
A. Applying the Immunity Standards.
As indicated previously,98 the Supreme Court has developed a
three-fold analysis to determine whether and to what extent section
1983 immunity should be granted. The analysis requires an examina-
tion of the legislative intent of section 1983, the immunity accorded at
common law, and the policy considerations supporting that immunity.
The legislative history of section 1983 reveals no congressional
consideration of the issue of private party immunity.99 In fact, the stat-
ute was aimed not at private persons, but rather at the inaction of state
and local authorities in the face of the Ku Klux Klan's lawless and
unbridled activities. 100 At the time section 1983 was enacted, the com-
mon law did not embody any principle to extend vicariously the immu-
94. Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir. 1974).
95. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976).
96. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
97. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
98. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
99. "Vicarious Immunity" 1036.
100. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 175-76 ("the remedy created was not a remedy against
[the Klan] or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable
or unwilling to enforce a state law") (emphasis in original). See generally "Vicarious Immunity"
1016-17.
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nity of officials to the actions of private persons.' 0 The only current
precedent for the extension is the unreasoned opinion in Haldane and
its progeny. 10 2 It is important to note that Supreme Court decisions
since Haldane that have held private persons liable under section 1983
have not mentioned applying official immunity to private parties. 0 3
Thus, an analysis of both the legislative history of section 1983 and the
common law does not support the derivative grant of immunity to pri-
vate persons. If private parties are to be granted immunity, the justifi-
cation must therefore be based on public policy.
The policy objective currently recognized by the Supreme Court to
justify granting immunity to public officials--encouraging public ser-
vants to give spirited service free from the fear of damages liability'0 4
-is not applicable to private persons. As the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has noted, "[p]rivate parties simply are not confronted
with the pressures of office, the often split-second decisionmaking or
the constant threat of liability facing police officers, governors and
other public officials."' 0 5 Private persons are, of course, free not to act
at all.10 6 It must be asked, however, whether there are other policy
considerations on which a doctrine of derivative immunity could be
founded. There are several policy arguments that have at various times
been forwarded as justifications for the doctrine of derivative immu-
nity. 0 7
1. Discouraging Frivolous Civil Rights Claims. One of the most
frequently articulated justifications for the doctrine of derivative im-
munity is the need to discourage frivolous civil rights claims.108 The
natural implication of this argument is that, in the absence of derivative
immunity, any time a claimant alleges a conspiracy between private
persons and immune officials, the issue must be litigated under section
1983.109 Although many frivolous actions are screened out by the per
101. "Vicarious Immunity" 1036; see Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 273 (7th Cir. 1979)
(en banc) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
102. See notes 11-23 supra and accompanying text.
103. See, eg., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787 (1966). See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 44, 50, & 53 supra.
105. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); accord,
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 273-74 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
106. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 274 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
107. These arguments are catalogued in Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J.,
concurring).
108. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Coleman and Ainsworth, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1339 (1980); Sparkman v. Mc-
Farlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
109. Proponents of the doctrine of derivative immunity have asserted that in its absence, "any-
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se rule of derivative immunity, many worthy section 1983 claims may
also be dismissed. 0 The frivolous claims argument ignores the critical
fact that section 1983 does not give rise to a cause of action merely
because a conspiracy between a private person and a state official is
alleged. First, there must be a deprivation of a constitutional right. As
has been noted, "[t]he gist of the cause of action [under section 1983] is
the deprivation. . . .""' Second, the deprivation must be carried out
under color of state law. The screening of frivolous claims can be ac-
complished by close scrutiny of the section 1983 requirements. Dis-
missing a claim for failure to allege the requisite deprivation of
constitutional protections or state action is handled more properly
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than under a per se rule of
vicarious immunity."12
2. Preventing Federal Court Monitoring of State Court Proceed-
ings. Section 1983 cases discussing derivative immunity have often in-
volved allegations of deprivations during the course of state court
proceedings." 3 Proponents of the doctrine of derivative immunity
one dissatisfied with the result of the litigation in state court can allege a 'conspiracy' sufficient to
obtain federal court review of his claim." Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 988
(Coleman and Ainsworth, JJ., dissenting).
110. In its recent rejection of the doctrine of derivative immunity, the Fifth Circuit noted:
We recognize that in doing so we cast away a tool for discouraging possible mischievous
lawsuits that, by intention or effect, harass judges for performing their offices. But this
tool, like a hot flatiron, is too awkward for service as a cautery and works too much
damage to surrounding structures for the small benefit it confers.
Id. at 983.
111. Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n.2. (7th Cir. 1975).
112. See Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1077
(1978). See notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text. The recent case of Henzel v. Gerstein, 608
F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1979), illustrates that derivative immunity is not necessary to screen frivo-
lous claims against private persons. Henzel was decided after the Fifth Circuit rejected derivative
immunity in Sparks. See notes 208-14 infra and accompanying text. The court rejected the theory
that summary judgment could be granted to the private defendants on the basis of derivative
immunity, but instead held that summary judgment would be appropriate because the allegations
of conspiracy were conclusory and wholly unsupported. As Henzel suggests, when derivative im-
munity is rejected, review of the pleadings in conspiracy cases will take on greater importance in
screening frivolous claims.
113. Eg., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 978 (state court judge, alleged to
have conspired with defendants, entered injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from producing oil);
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 261 (state court judge, alleged to have conspired with defend-
ants, signed petition for sterilization of plaintiff); Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d 285, 286-87 (5th Cir.)
(per curiam) (tax collector alleged conspiracy and unlawful criminal prosecution at examination
hearing in which justice of peace ruled that he should be bound over to the grand jury in connec-
tion with missing sales tax receipts), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978), overruled, Sparks v. Duval
County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 978, 983 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1339
(1980); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (state prisoner alleged
that judge, attorney, and ex-wife conspired to have default judgment in divorce, child custody,
and property settlement action in state court entered against him while he was incarcerated and
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charge that, even though immune state court judges cannot be named
defendants, allegations of conspiracy are an attempt to make them
'"personally answerable in federal court to private litigants for their
state judicial. . . acts,"' "14 and "to obtain a review and a retrial of the
State Court proceedings."'l 5 Furthermore, it is argued that the federal
courts, under the guise of enforcing civil rights, might monitor the state
courts and "furnish a remedy for each losing party in every state court
proceeding."" 16 If section 1983 suits in federal court were to have these
effects, the relationship between state and federal courts would be dra-
matically altered. These consequences, however, do not result from a
section 1983 suit.
The only question raised by an alleged section 1983 conspiracy
involving state court judges is whether the judge conspired with a pri-
vate party to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected
rights. Moreover, the federal courts have original jurisdiction, not ap-
pellate jurisdiction, in a civil rights complaint. The 1983 suit is neither
a retrial of the state court proceedings nor a review of that court's legal
theories. The state court proceeding merely provides the factual setting
for the alleged conspiracy. It is true that if a section 1983 conspiracy is
found to exist, injunctive relief dissolving the state court's decision may
be granted. If no conspiracy is found to exist, however, the inquiry in
federal court will end. Federal adjudication of an action alleging a sec-
tion 1983 conspiracy between a private person and an immune state
judge does not create a sovereignty crisis between the state and federal
systems.
3. Promoting the Cooperation of Private Persons with State Offi-
cials. Proponents of the doctrine claim that without derivative immu-
nity, the fear of liability under section 1983 would deter private persons
from reporting crimes or cooperating with state officials. They note
that
private persons who are victims of, or witnesses to a crime should not
be discouraged from reporting the crime or from following the ad-
vice of a prosecuting attorney as to whether to lodge a formal com-
plaint against, or to appear as a witness against, the perpetrator.
unable to appear in court); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1965) (party to
divorce action ordered by state court judge to undergo mental health examination).
114. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 986 (Coleman and Ainsworth, JJ., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 988 (Coleman and Ainsworth, JJ., dissenting) (quoting French v. Corrigan, 432
F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1970)).
116. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring). It should be recog-
nized that this argument is a particularized form of the frivolous claims theory. See notes 108-12
supra and accompanying text.
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Similarly, in civil matters, private persons should not be discouraged
from or penalized for seeking the aid or judicial approval of a court
before embarking upon activities of ambiguous legality.17
This argument overlooks the requirements of section 1983 liability.
It suggests that merely seeking the advice of a prosecutor or a court or
testifying as a witness will subject private individuals to section 1983
liability. Reporting a crime or cooperating with state officials does not
by itself violate the statute, however. A section 1983 plaintiff must al-
lege and prove a conspiracy to deprive him of a constitutional right.
The unilateral act of filing a complaint or testifying at trial is simply
not within the scope of the statute.
4. Preventing a Time-Consuming Collateral Attack Against Im-
mune State Actors. Although an immune state official cannot be
named as a party defendant in a section 1983 conspiracy, it has been
asserted that allowing the alleged private co-conspirator to be sued
would subject the public official to a collateral attack on his reputation
and integrity." 8 This attack would raise in the state actor an "appre-
hension of personal consequences to himself,"1' 9 thereby frustrating
the rationale for cloaking the state official with immunity. In addition
to threatening the official's reputation, discovery and time-consuming
appearances as a witness would keep the official from performing his
public duties.' 20
The section 1983 immunity enjoyed by judges, prosecutors, and
certain other state officials exists not for the personal benefit of the state
actor,' 2 ' but to promote spirited public service.' 22 Immunity is a harsh
rule and one "laden with potential for unredressed wrong." 23 Because
it is an exception to the strict liability rule of section 1983, it has been
limited to particular classes of officials and protects them only from
liability for damages. It is true that requiring officials to testify at a
conspiracy trial allows collateral attack of their integrity. This injury is
comparatively insignificant, however, when the alternative is to confer
immunity on a private party who has joined with an official to deprive
117. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
118. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 984-86 (Coleman and Ainsworth,
JJ., dissenting).
119. Id. at 984 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978)).
120. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
121. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 979 ("the absolute immunity that
judges enjoy exists for the benefit of the judicial system and of the public, not for that of the
judge").
122. See notes 44, 50 & 53 supra.
123. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 980.
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another person of a constitutional right. 124 Furthermore, even in juris-
dictions that apply derivative immunity, an attack on an official's repu-
tation may be made. State judges, for instance, are amenable to
process in many situations. 125 In addition, there are many other means
of attacking an official's reputation.1 26 Thus, derivative immunity, if its
purpose is to protect official reputations, is underinclusive.
The time and effort expended by public officials testifying at con-
spiracy trials is an unresolved empirical question. With respect to state
judges, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that this
obligation is comparatively insignificant.127 At the very least, the bur-
den should be on the proponents of derivative immunity to establish
their claim of duty interference empirically before it is endorsed as a
justification for the doctrine. Any slight inconvenience and embarrass-
ment for the state official is surely "less important than . . . bringing
conspirators to book."1 28
5. Preventing Unfairness in Holding One Conspirator Immune and
Another Liable. It has been suggested that it "seems manifestly unfair"
that the state's expert should be immunized from attack under section
1983 while the untutored lay person is left vulnerable to a costly attack
for participating in the same activity as the state official.' 29 Although
some form of protection is legitimate for a private party who, in good
faith, relies on or simply obeys a state official, 13o there is nothing novel
in holding co-conspirators liable even though a fellow conspirator is
immune.' 3' As the Fifth Circuit has recently asserted, "'[a]t least two
124. See id. Even if suits against private persons were used as a techinque to harass the im-
mune officials, a summary judgment proceeding under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, with liberal use of affidavits and depositions, would be preferable to the dismissal of all
similar section 1983 suits under the theory of derivative immunity. See also Bristow, § 1983: An
Analysis and SuggestedApproach, 29 ARK. L. REv. 255, 326-27 (1975).
125. State judges are not immune from equitable relief. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.,
604 F.2d at 980; see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975) ("immunity from damages
does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well"); United Steelworkers v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408, 413
(5th Cir. 1979) (leaving open possibility that judge "may be the object of equitable relief in proper
cases"). Nor does immunity exist for judges under the criminal law. A state judge is also amena-
ble to process when he is a witness to an incident giving rise to a lawsuit. Sparks v. Duval County
Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 981.
126. Because of the current state of defamation law and the public figure status of state court
judges, the media provide useful forums for attacking these judges' integrity and reputation.
127. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 980. Contra, id. at 989 (Coleman and
Ainsworth, JJ., dissenting).
128. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 274 n.9 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (quoting Slotnick v.
Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978)).
129. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
130. See notes 221-31 infra and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C. Cir.) (wife allowed to proceed against
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persons must join in an unlawful enterprise to constitute it a conspir-
acy .... But both need not be prosecuted, or prosecutable. One may
die, may escape, or obtain pardon; but the other remains guilty.' "132
In section 1983 cases, there can be little objection to holding a per-
son liable for his acts, independent of the treatment of those who acted
with him. The Supreme Court has commanded that the statute "be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsi-
ble for the natural consequences of his actions."1 33 The doctrine of
derivative immunity nevertheless offers an "actual incentive to corrup-
tion. . . with its promise of civil immunity to those who succeed in
involving a [state official's] powers in their nefarious schemes .... ,,134
This result is clearly at odds with the mandate in section 1983 to en-
force the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.135
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the policy arguments
forwarded by the proponents of derivative immunity are unconvincing.
From its very beginning in Haldane, the doctrine developed without a
careful inquiry into the underlying issues and policies.1 36 Stare decisis,
not exacting legal analysis, may be the best explanation for current sup-
port of the doctrine. A complete evaluation of the doctrine of deriva-
tive immunity reveals several additional factors that reflect adversely
upon its soundness.
B. State Action and Immunit--A Confusion of Concepts.
Under the doctrine of derivative immunity, a plaintiff bringing a
section 1983 action against a private party must be able to state a valid
claim against the public official with whom the private party is alleged
to have conspired; 37 if the official is immune, the requirement cannot
two co-conspirators even though a third, her husband, was dismissed because of interspousal im-
munity), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939); Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1938)
(conspiracy conviction affirmed even though co-conspirator enjoyed diplomatic immunity).
132. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 981 (quoting Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98
F.2d at 544).
133. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187.
134. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 980.
135. See Developments in the Law 1135.
136. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. Several of the arguments supporting the
doctrine are not tailored to the concept of derivative immunity but instead have been listed in
other contexts as reasons for restricting the section 1983 action. See Comment, The Evolution of
the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47 TUL. L. REv. 870, 885 (1973) ("Arguments in
favor of restricting the availability of a federal forum are as follows: ...the federal courts will
become clogged with trivial litigation. . . and. . . the federal courts will be injected into the area
of local police regulation thereby upsetting the balance of authority in the federal-state relation-
ship").
137. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
Vol. 1980:568]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
be met and the suit must be dismissed.138 This reasoning of courts that
have adopted the derivative immunity doctrine implicitly accepts the
following theory: (1) section 1983 requires state action; (2) when the
complaint is against a private party, liability will follow only if the pri-
vate party conspired with a state official; (3) if, however, the state offi-
cial is immune, the plaintiff cannot state a cause of action against him;
and (4) the state action therefore vanishes and the plaintiffs suit must
be dismissed.
The requirement that the plaintiff be able to state a valid claim
against the public defendant, however, arises from the courts' confu-
sion of the concepts of immunity for a state official and state action.
State action is clearly an essential jurisdictional prerequisite for a sec-
tion 1983 claim. When it is lacking, the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "Alternatively a question of
whether a defendant is immune, either qualifiedly or absolutely, is not
a jurisdictional issue. Rather, immunity is an affirmative defense
which may defeat the section 1983 claim once that subject matter juris-
diction has been established."1 39 As the Fifth Circuit has recently rec-
ognized,
[a state official's] immunity from the damages remedy [does] not in
any manner [affect] his capacity to conspire .... In assaying for
state action, the question is not at all whether the agent of the state
who acts is subject to any particular sanction. Rather, it is whether
he has exercised the power of the state .... 140
The decision in Russell v. Town of Mamaroneckl4' illustrates the
confusion of the immunity and state action concepts. In two related
actions, plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory judgments against
a township and private defendants for authorizing private parties to
place nativity scenes on public lands. The plaintiffs premised federal
jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),142 the jurisdictional counterpart of
section 1983. The court found jurisdiction to be lacking because the
municipal defendants were not "persons" within the meaning of section
1983,143 and thus were immune from suit. In turn, the court held that
"it is not possible that the private defendants acted under color of state
law on the basis of joint activity with the public defendants."'' 44
138. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
139. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
140. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 982.
141. 440 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
143. Russell was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in MAnell. See notes 83-84
supra and accompanying text.
144. 440 F. Supp. at 612 (emphasis added).
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Clearly, state action cannot simply be erased by the absence of the
public actor as a defendant due to his immunity. 145 Under section 1983,
state action and immunity are two separate issues. Analysis, therefore,
properly should be conducted in two stages. First, the court should
examine the statutory requirements for a section 1983 claim: state ac-
tion and deprivation. Second, it should evaluate the defenses available
to each defendant, on a defendant-by-defendant basis. The derivative
immunity doctrine, however, unjustifiably mixes these concepts by re-
quiring the absence of an immunity defense as a prerequisite to, and
thereby an element of, state action.
C. The Arbitrary Nature of the Derivative Immunity Defense.
As the derivative immunity defense is currently applied, the
destiny of the private defendant is initially contingent not upon his own
acts, but upon the acts of the public co-conspirator. Whether the pri-
vate defendant receives any measure of immunity is entirely dependent
upon the liability of the public official with whom he has acted. 146 In
many instances, this determination of the public official's immunity
will create a windfall defense for the private party 147 and deny the ag-
grieved party any relief under section 1983. In short, the defendant's
guilt is initially contingent upon matters over which the defendant has
no control. The derivative immunity doctrine demonstrates its mani-
fest injustice by permitting this arbitrary determination of liability.
D. A Doctrine in Limbo.
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the doctrine of derivative
immunity cannot withstand a careful examination based on policy or
theory. In addition, several individual judges 148 have noted that the
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Price149 and Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 15 which postdate Haldane, undercut the artificial
precedent for the doctrine. Both decisions establish that private indi-
145. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). Similarly,
the removal of a co-conspirator as a defendant does not erase the conspiracy. See text accompa-
nying notes 131-32 supra.
146. See "Vicarious Immunity" 1037.
147. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 274 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
148. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 271 n.5 (Swygert, J., dissenting); Slotnick v. Stavis-
key, 560 F.2d 31, 33 n.1 (1st Cir. 1977) (Coffin, C.J., "speaking only for himself'), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1077 (1978).
149. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
150. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, the Court upheld the sufficiency of a section 1983 com-
plaint in which the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between a store owner and the local police to
deprive her of equal protection of the law on the basis of race.
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viduals who conspire with state officials are acting under color of state
law regardless of whether the state official is joined in the suit. There-
fore, private parties should be liable under section 1983 for conspiracy
with state officials, even if the officials are not and cannot be named as
defendants in the suit.
Not surprisingly, when the doctrine has been carefully reasoned, it
has fallen into disfavor.' 5 ' One court of appeals, however, has sug-
gested a novel approach for curtailing the doctrine of derivative immu-
nity without expressly overturning it. This approach is discussed in the
following section.
IV. THE ELEVATED (STRICT) PLEADING STANDARD
A. The Seventh Circuit's Suggestion.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested an alter-
nate approach to the doctrine of derivative immunity in Sparkman v.
McFarlin. 52 While avoiding the derivative immunity issue, the court
dismissed a section 1983 claim for failure to allege with sufficient par-
ticularity facts that would show a conspiracy between an immune state
official and private persons.
In Sparkman, the complaint arose from the sterilization of the
plaintiff when she was fifteen years old. The plaintiff's mother, con-
cerned by her daughter's apparent promiscuity and slowness in learn-
ing, petitioned an Indiana state judge to have a tubal ligation
performed on her daughter, to "prevent unfortunate circumstances."' 153
The judge approved the petition, which included a covenant indemni-
fying the hospital and doctors in any legal action, without a hearing
and without appointing a guardian ad litem for the plaintiff. 54 Subse-
quently, the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital, having been told
that her appendix would be removed. Instead, the tubal ligation was
performed and she was released, unaware of the true nature of her sur-
151. The doctrine has been specifically rejected in the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits and its
validity i the Seventh Circuit is currently very uncertain. See notes 26-29 supra & 159-65, 199-
214 infra and accompanying text. Even in the Ninth Circuit, where the doctrine had its origin in
Haldane, "[i]t is [currently] unclear whether a private party who conspires with a state official who
is clothed with immunity is liable under § 1983.. Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 858
n.10 (9th Cir. 1977).
152. 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (en banc).
153. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977), revdsub nora. Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). For a full statement of the facts as developed on appeal, see 552 F.2d at
173-74.
154. In A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), a decision handed down
after the sterilization of the plaintiff in Sparkman, the Indiana court held that a parent does not
possess a common law right to have a minor child sterilized, even though the parent might "sin-
cerely believe the child's adulthood would benefit therefrom." Id. at 638, 325 N.E.2d at 502.
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gery. Two years later, after being informed of her sterility, the plaintiff
filed a section 1983 suit naming as defendants her mother, the mother's
attorney who drafted the petition to sterilize, the state court judge who
approved the petition, the three doctors who performed or assisted in
the sterilization, and the hospital in which the surgery was performed.
In dismissing the complaint, the district court found the judge abso-
lutely immune and extended his immunity derivatively to destroy any
action, 155 thus barring the claims against the private defendants. 156
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the judge was not entitled to
immunity because he had acted extrajudicially and that the claims
against the other defendants were therefore valid.' 57 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision again, finding that the state judge had not
acted in a clear absence of jurisdicition and that he was therefore enti-
tled to judicial immunity. 58 The Supreme Court remanded the case
for further proceedings on the liability of the private defendants and
thus did not address the validity of the derivative immunity doctrine.
In a per curiam opinion, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the private
defendants.' 59 Although the opinion merely affirmed the opinion of
the district court, two concurring opinions expressly suggested that an
elevated pleading standard be applied to section 1983 claims against
private defendants alleged to have conspired with immune public offi-
cials.' 60 A majority of the panel agreed that the complaint in this case
failed to allege a conspiracy with sufficient specificity.
In the plurality opinion,16 written by Judge Sprecher, the court
155. The holding of the district court is another example of the confusion between state action
and the immunity of a state official. See text accompanying notes 137-45 supra.
156. Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civ. No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976), rev'd, 552 F.2d 172
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
157. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub noam. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978).
158. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
159. 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (en banc). The court's opinion was highly
divided. In addition to the per curiam opinion, three concurring opinions and one dissenting
opinion were issued, with each of the remaining four judges joining either a concurrence or the
dissent. The eight judges were equally divided on the question of derivative immunity.
160. Id. at 262 (Fairchild, C.J., concurring); id. at 263 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
161. Although the per curiam opinion merely affirms the district court decision, Judge
Sprecher's opinion was the most well-reasoned of the concurrences supporting the affirmance and
his opinion will be designated as the plurality decision for the purposes of this Comment. Judge
Sprecher's opinion called for both the abandonment of derivative immunity and the application of
a strict pleading standard. The court was divided on both issues. Chief Judge Fairchild and
Judge Sprecher expressly favored an elevated pleading standard while Judges Swygert, Cum-
mings, Sprecher, and Wood were opposed to derivative immunity. Five members of the eight-
member panel, therefore, agreed with at least part of Judge Sprecher's opinion. Judges Pell,
Bauer, and Tone did not feel that the complaint contained sufficient allegations of a conspiracy,
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noted that before a private person can be found liable, a nexus with the
state, one of its entities, or one of its officials must be shown. 62 Rely-
ing on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,163 the plurality required that "the
private party '[reach] an understanding' through a meeting of the
minds" with the state official.164 The failure of the pleadings to list
specific facts to show this level of conspiracy, the requisite nexus,
should render the complaint conclusory and insufficient. The plurality
implied that if the factual particulars could be alleged, private persons
might be exposed to section 1983 liability, despite the immunity of the
government co-conspirator. 65
B. Close Scrutiny or an Elevated Requirement?
Careful scrutiny of pleadings to screen out insubstantial com-
plaints is not novel in the context of section 1983 conspiracy claims.166
This review, however, is used only to insure that the statutory require-
ments-some form of state action and a deprivation of a constitutional
right-are alleged.167 Allegations of overt acts that are reasonably re-
lated to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy have always been re-
quired, 168 but not allegations of a meeting of the minds. Alleging overt,
evidentiary acts of a conspiracy is certainly less burdensome to the
plaintiff than averring the alleged conspirators' state of mind. Typical
complaints that have been dismissed as conclusory under careful scru-
tiny are those in which the allegations in the complaint detail the
course of state litigation and conclude that a conspiracy must have
been afoot for such a result to have been obtained.1 69
but they stopped short of expressly calling for an elevated standard of pleading. See id. at 269 n. I
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 264 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
163. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
164. 601 F.2d at 264 (Sprecher, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 266.
166. See, e.g., Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077
(1978); Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1975); Croy v. Skinner, 410 F. Supp. 117,
126 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
167. This scrutiny of the pleadings is similar to the type recommended previously. See text
accompanying note 112 supra.
168. See, e.g., Morales v. Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 (1st Cir. 1978); Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549
F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir. 1977); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir.
1964); Croy v. Skinner, 410 F. Supp. 117, 126 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Byrd v. Local 24, IBEW, 375 F.
Supp. 545, 558 (D. Md. 1974). This close scrutiny (as opposed to a strict pleading standard) ap-
pears to have been adopted by the Fifth Circuit in two cases decided after Sparkman. See Henzel
v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1979); Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at
978.
169. See e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 426 (2d Cir. 1978); Powell v. Workmen's
Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d at 137.
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In comparison to the typical careful scrutiny, the plurality opinion
in Sparkman imposes a stricter pleading threshold. 170 The Sparkman
plurality would require additional specificity about the co-conspirators'
170. There are several reasons for concluding that the plurality, and possibly a majority of the
court, sought in Sparkman to establish an elevated pleading requirement. First, the language in
the concurring and dissenting opinions indicates that a more exacting standard is in fact required.
Chief Judge Fairchild stated, "I would build into any principle for the recognition of a § 1983
claim based on a private person's conspiracy with a state judge, a requirement of pleading and
proof. . . that there was agreement between the party and the judge. ... 601 F.2d at 262
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring). Judge Sprecher claimed that disposing of the liability of private
parties by requiring particularity in alleging a conspiracy has allowed the court to avoid taking a
position on the doctrine of derivative immunity. Id. at 266 (Sprecher, J., concurring). In addition,
Judge Swygert, in his dissent, was convinced that the plurality applied "a new and more demand-
ing pleading requirement" than is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 275
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
Second, in Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the district court implied that
when a section 1983 conspiracy is alleged between private parties and state officials, additional
facts must be pleaded if the state official involved is immune. See id. at 488-89. Like Sparkman,
Baer involved a section 1983 complaint lodged by a child against his parent. The plaintiffs par-
ents had obtained the assistance of a state court and a private organization in their effort to
deprogram the plaintiff, who was a follower of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon and a member of
the Unification Church. In dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, the court held
that a private plaintiff would "have to allege sufficient facts to overcome the immunity from liabil-
ity courts have granted public officials in § 1983 suits." Id. at 488 (emphasis added). Signifi-
cantly, the district court in Baer sat in the Ninth Circuit, which developed the concept of
derivative immunity in Haldane. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text. Recently, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit has hinted that the validity of the doctrine is somewhat in question there.
See note 151 supra. Given the uneasiness in both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over the doc-
trine, it appears that the Sparkman court, like the Baer court, was trying to steer a middle course
away from derivative immunity without expressly rejecting it.
Third, when the Seventh Circuit first received the Sparkman case on appeal, it held that the
state judge was not immune, but never questioned the sufficiency of the pleadings. In addition,
the sufficiency of the pleadings had not been questioned by the district court. 601 F.2d at 281
(Swygert, J., dissenting). On remand from the Supreme Court, however, five of the judges (a
majority), in concurring opinions, stated that the pleadings were insufficient to state a section 1983
claim. See note 161 supra. Because the case was not dismissed for insufficient pleadings when
first received, the court, on remand, must have been announcing a new pleading standard.
Finally, the pleadings in Sparkman appear to meet the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See 601 F.2d at 275 n.14 (Swygert, J., dissenting). For example, paragraph 30 of
the complaint provided:
The actions of Defendants . . . in concert and with the common goal and result of
sterilizing Linda Kay Sparkman, deprived said Linda Kay Sparkman of her constitu-
tional and statutory rights to privacy, to the equal protection of the laws and to not be
deprived of life or property without the due process of law.
Id. at 268 n.8 (Sprecher, J., concurring). In addition, the pleadings are more specific than those
that have been upheld as sufficient in other circuits. See, e.g., Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (sterilization case similar to Sparkman; complaint al-
leging concerted action between private defendants and public officials, some of whom were im-
mune, held sufficient to state a section 1983 cause of action based on conspiracy); Fine v. City of
New York, 529 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1975) (allegation that plaintiffs private attorney cooperated
with police and failed to identify himself as plaintiffs attorney during an unlawful search of his
client's apartment held sufficient to state a section 1983 cause of action for conspiracy against
attorney).
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meeting of minds, but only in a section 1983 conspiracy complaint
against a private party when his public co-conspirator is immune from
suit. Presumably, when the public official is not immune, such specific-
ity in the pleadings would not be required. The obvious purpose of this
strict pleading rule is to avoid the issue of derivative immunity. As the
plurality opinion reveals, the court is looking for a rule that is flexible
enough to accommodate the policy considerations on both sides of the
question.' 7T The requirement of fact-specific pleading, however, over-
looks an important, competing policy embodied in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
C. A Critique of the Strict Pleading Test.
Analysis of the specific pleading requirement suggested by the
Seventh Circuit in Sparkman indicates that it is inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under rule 8(a)(2), a pleading need
only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."' 172 The most important feature of rule 8(a)
is the substitution of "a short and plain statement" for the prior code
formula, "facts constituting a cause of action."173 As the Supreme
Court has stated in its frequently cited Conley v. Gibson t74 opinion,
"the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
171. 601 F.2d at 267 (Sprecher, J., concurring). The strict pleading standard is a middle
ground, providing a remedy only when a section 1983 violation clearly exists. Id. at 267-68. As
has been noted, however, careful scrutiny will suffice to screen out many frivolous suits. See notes
112 & 166-69, supra and accompanying text. Further, section 1983 should not be restricted to the
clear case; when the question of liability is close, it should go to the jury. See notes 195-96 infra
and accompanying text.
172. Rule 8(a)(2) provides: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain. . . a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
173. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 1202, at 59. In contrast to the broad general pleadings of
rule 8, rule 9 catalogs several special matters that must be pleaded with specificity. Rule 9 requires
that "[iun all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity." FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b). A variety of reasons have been given for the
detailed pleading requirements of fraud and mistake. Among them are claims that
[aIllegations of fraud or mistake frequently are advanced only for their nuisance or set-
tlement value and with little hope that they will be successful. . . . Also, fraud and
mistake embrace such a wide variety of potential conduct that a defendant needs a sub-
stantial amount of particularized information about plaintiffs claim in order to enable
him to understand it and effectively prepare his response.
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 1296, at 399-400. Although conspiracy, like fraud, is a conclusion of
law, it embraces a much narrower variety of conduct than does fraud. A defendant, therefore,
would need less particularized information when charged with civil conspiracy than with fraud.
More important, the fraud and mistake provisions of rule 9 operate as an exception to the general
rule of notice pleading under rule 8. Conspiracy is not listed in rule 9 as one of the specific
exceptions to rule 8. By negative implication, therefore, particularized facts need not be pleaded
in an averment of conspiracy under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
174. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim."' 175 Rather, they
require only that the defendant be given "fair notice of what the plain-
tiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' 76 Significantly,
the Supreme Court has indicated that this same level of specificity per-
tains to section 1983 complaints. 177 Great generality, therefore, is per-
mitted in the pleadings as long as the defendant is given fair notice of
the basis of the claim.178
Fair notice under the Federal Rules, of course, does contemplate a
statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the
claim presented. 179 More detail is required than a bald statement by
the plaintiff "that he has a valid claim of some type."'180 What must be
pleaded ultimately depends on the nature of the complaint itself. A
prima facie case of civil conspiracy consists of three elements: a combi-
nation of two or more persons acting in concert unlawfully, an agree-
ment between the parties "to inflict a wrong against or injury to
another,"' 8' and "an overt act that results in damage."' 182 Clearly the
most difficult element to prove is the agreement. In a case involving a
section 1983 claim decided nine days before Sparkman, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that "[a]n express agreement among all the conspir-
ators is not a necessary element of a civil conspiracy."'81 3 To demon-
strate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement it need only be shown
that there was "a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of
which [was] known to each person who is to be held responsible for its
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id.
177. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). See text accompanying notes 191-92
infra.
178. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 1202, at 64. Professors Wright and Miller have noted that
"[u]nder the federal rules it is very difficult for counsel to draft a pleading so badly as to lose the
rights of his clients. Indeed, it has been said that 'a sixteen year old boy could plead' under these
rules." Id. § 1202, at 65 (quoting CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES, PROCEEDINGS
220 (1938)).
179. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 1202, at 64.
180. Id. § 1357, at 596.
181. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Rotermund v.
United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1973)). The elements of civil conspiracy apply
to a section 1983 conspiracy.
182. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d at 620-21.
183. Id. at 621 ("The participants in the conspiracy must share the general conspiratorial ob-
jective, but they need not know all the details of the plan designed to achieve the objective or
possess the same motives for desiring the intended conspiratorial result"). Hampton is revealing
because the Seventh Circuit applied a more liberal pleading standard for conspiracy in that case
than it did in Sparkman. Unlike Sparkman, Hampton did not involve private defendants or find-
ings of immunity on behalf of the public defendants.
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consequences."' 84 A plaintiff need not show that each participant in
the conspiracy knew "the exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity
of all participants therein."' 8 5
In spite of the foregoing, the Seventh Circuit in Sparkman appar-
ently required the section 1983 plaintiff to plead with particularity that
the private party attained a meeting of the minds with the immune state
official or officials.'8 6 By seeking an alternative to the doctrine of deriv-
ative immunity, the plurality in Sparkman utilized a strict pleading re-
quirement that confuses what the plaintiff must plead in the complaint
with what the plaintiff must show at trial.'8 7 In essence, the elevated
pleading standard would require the plaintiff to plead with specificity
an element of the case that would be dispositive of the claim. This
certainly goes far beyond the notice requirement of rule 8(a). 8s The
Supreme Court's language in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., '8 9 which the
Seventh Circuit cited in Sparkman, reveals the flaw in the court's ap-
proach: "[P]etitioner will have made out a violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment rights and will be entitled to relief under § 1983 if she can
prove that a [store] employee . . . and a [city] policeman somehow
reached an understanding ....
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,'9' the Supreme Court reasoned that the re-
quirements for pleading a civil conspiracy are different from and more
liberal than the requirements for proving a conspiracy. The Court in-
structed:
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint,
184. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971), quoted with qp-
provalin Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d at 621.
185. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d at 875, quoted with approvalin Hampton
v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d at 621.
186. See notes 159-165 supra and accompanying text.
187. Although the reason for the confusion is not clear, it is possibly due to the derivative
nature of the state action requirement in section 1983 conspiracy cases. In these cases, the under
color of law requirement must be derived from the conspiracy. The conspiracy in turn must be
derived, at least in part, from the existence of an agreement, which in turn is dependent on some
form of meeting of the minds. Thus, the meeting of the minds is thrice removed from the state
action requirement.
188. It is important to note that the Sparkman court was dismissing the complaint for failure
to state a claim. This was not a ruling upon a motion for summary judgment. General allegations
are insufficient to win summary judgment. Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that, in making a motion for summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In addition, the dismissal in
Sparkman was not the result of a motion for a more definite statement of the complaint under rule
12(e).
189. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
190. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
191. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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before the reception of any evidence by affidavit or admissions, its
task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of
the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is
not the test. 19
2
The Supreme Court has also declared that in passing on the suffi-
ciency of the pleadings courts should construe the allegations in the
complaint favorably to the pleader, and that a complaint should not be
dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief."' 93 This liberal construction is especially applicable to a charge of
conspiracy. "In many cases of conspiracy essential information can
only be produced through discovery, and the parties should not be
thrown out of court before being given an opportunity through that
process to ascertain whether the linkage they think may exist actually
does."194
Thus, the liberal requirements of the Federal Rules would require
a dismissal only when the complaint is clearly deficient. The strict
pleading test suggested in Sparkman, however, by adhering to a fairly
strict standard for pleading and proof, would restrict section 1983 lia-
bility to those situations in which a "competing interest-the need to
vindicate violated constitutional rights-clearly, exists."195 The close
case would be taken away from the jury. This is clearly contrary to the
Supreme Court's assertion that when a plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to
violate civil rights, "[tihe existence or nonexistence of a conspiracy is
essentially a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, should de-
cide." 196
If the strict pleading standard enunciated by Sparkman is meant to
be an exception to the general rule under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is nevertheless doubtful that it would accomplish the goal
192. Id. at 236.
193. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citation omitted).
194. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 611 (10th Cir. 1979).
195. 601 F.2d at 267-68.
196. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J., concurring). The Sev-
enth Circuit has expressly recognized the validity of this point. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600
F.2d at 621. It has even gone a step further and held that
the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil
conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can "infer from the circum-
stances [that the alleged conspirators] had a 'meeting of the minds' and thus reached an
understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objectives."
Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 158-59). Hampton, however, did not involve
a conspiracy between private parties and public officials; this fact gives added support to the asser-
tion that Sparkman employs a separate test for plaintiffs seeking to recover against private parties
when the public official involved is immune. See notes 170 & 183 supra.
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of screening frivolous lawsuits. "[E]recting a pleading barrier between
the courtroom and ungrounded lawsuits is likely to be an unsatisfac-
tory means of avoiding frivolous litigation, since persons disposed to
bring such litigation would probably have little difficulty explicating
their alleged grievances with particularity."19 7
The elevated pleading standard suggested by the Seventh Circuit
may also, sub silentio, alter the substantive law of civil conspiracy in an
attempt to salvage a needless doctrine. It has been suggested that a
fact-specific pleading requirement may necessitate direct evidence of a
conspiracy and thus foreclose the use of circumstantial evidence.198
While less offensive than the absolute bar of derivative immunity,
a strict pleading requirement would nonetheless operate to block at
least some worthy claims. This requirement, like derivative immunity,
would be triggered by events over which the private defendant has no
control. The private defendant benefitting from the strict pleading re-
quirement would do so only because of the fortuitous circumstance that
the public official with whom he acted was immune. If the public co-
conspirator were not immune, the elevated pleadings would not be re-
quired. At best, the strict pleading test is a compromise. The compro-
mise of an unncecessary doctrine, however, can hardly be embraced.
V. STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has consistently rejected
197. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 989 (Coleman and Ainsworth, JJ., dis-
senting).
198. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 279 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Under the substan-
tive law of civil conspiracy, proof of the conspiracy may be provided by circumstantial evidence,
since conspirators rarely formulate their plans in ways susceptible of proof by direct evidence.
Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 1979); Ferguson v. Omnimedia, Inc., 469 F.2d 194,
198 (1st Cir. 1972); Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971). The
facts in Crowe are to some extent similar to those in Sparkman. The results of the cases, however,
are very different. In Crowe, the court held that the evidence "showed that the defendants had
participated in private meetings at which [the plaintiff] was discussed. From this evidence and the
testimony regarding the defendant's course of conduct toward [the plaintiff], the jury could rea-
sonably have inferred that a conspiracy existed." 595 F.2d at 993.
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Supreme Court noted that the
conspiracy claim was based not on allegations of facts demonstrating a meeting of the minds, but
instead on the argument that "although [the plaintiff] had no knowledge of an agreement between
[the private defendant] and the police, the sequence of events created a substantial enough possi-
bility of a conspiracy to allow [plaintiff] to proceed to trial." Id. at 157, quoted in Sparkman v.
McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 280 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The requirement that a plaintiff who is alleg-
ing a conspiracy between a private party and an immune public dflicial state facts that specifically
demonstrate a meeting of the minds necessitates direct evidence of the conspiracy in the pleadings.
Under the current law of civil conspiracy, however, only circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy
need be shown at trial.
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the doctrine of derivative immunity. 199 In Downs v. Sawtelle,200 the
First Circuit announced its requirements for a prima facie cause of ac-
tion for a section 1983 complaint against a private party alleged to have
conspired with an immune public official. The court held that "once
the requisite showing of concerted action is made, and assuming that
some colorable constitutional deprivation is made out, the injured
party has an independent cause of action for damages against the pri-
vate party involved."'20 1
The initial pleading requirements for a section 1983 conspiracy in
the First Circuit, therefore, are an allegation of concerted action, evi-
dence of an overt act, and a colorable constitutional deprivation. 20 2 A
pleading of specific facts tending to show a meeting of the minds is not
required. In light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure20 3 and the
circumstantial manner in which a conspiracy can be shown,204 the First
Circuit approach is clearly preferable to a strict pleading test. Ade-
quate and fair notice, the purpose of rule 8(a)(2), is given to the defend-
ants, and the plaintiff is correspondingly entitled to discovery. In the
section 1983 claim based on conspiracy, discovery is probably critical
to the plaintiff's case.
Moreover, the First Circuit has rejected any form of qualified im-
munity that would be applied to private persons independently of the
immunity of state officials. 20 5 Adhering closely to the Supreme Court's
instructions in Monroe, the First Circuit maintains that section 1983
"should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a
man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. '20 6 In the
context of section 1983, this imposes a strict liability standard on pri-
199. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Slotnick v.
Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); Kermit Constr. Corp.
v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976).
200. 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
201. 574 F.2d at 15.
202. See also Skyes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974). These pleading require-
ments are consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at
152. See note 150 supra. In that case the Court held that for a private party to have acted under
color of state law, "[i]t is enough that he [was] a willful participant in joint activity with the State
or its agents .... " Courts that have rejected the concept of derivative immunity have relied
heavily on the Adikes decision. See, e.g., Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d at 982-83;
Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d at 15.
203. See notes 172-97 supra and accompanying text.
204. See note 198 supra.
205. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d at 16 ("We hold that the Wood defense is not available to
[the private defendant] and that her liability is to be determined by the jury without regard to any
claim of good faith"). See text accompanying note 63 supra for a discussion of Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
206. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d at 15 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187). Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 701, only overturned Monroe to the extent that it held
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vate persons acting in concert with state officials to deprive another of
rights secured by the Constitution. 20 7
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Sparks v. Duval
County Ranch Co.,208 has also expressly rejected the doctrine of deriva-
tive immunity. This recent decision reversed a long line of section 1983
cases in the Fifth Circuit that had upheld the doctrine. 20 9 In Sparks, a
state court judge had entered an injunction prohibiting the plaintiffs
from producing a particular supply of oil. The plaintiffs brought a sec-
tion 1983 action, claiming that the judge and four private party defend-
ants had conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of their oil production.
Because the judge was absolutely immune, the district court, operating
under the derivative immunity doctrine, dismissed the complaint
municipalities not to be "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. See notes 84-92 sivra and
accompanying text.
207. In section 1983 case law prior to Monroe, the courts generally required that the defendant
specifically intend to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. They read a
purposive intent requirement into the statute by analogizing section 1983 to its criminal counter-
part, 18 U.S.C. § 242, (1976), see note 5 supra, which explicitly requires the defendant to act
wilfully before criminal liability can be found. Comment, supra note 136, at 871. In Monroe,
however, the Supreme Court read section 1983 literally and rejected the wilfull requirement as an
element of the cause of action. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas noted: "The word
'wilfully' does not appear in [section 1983. The statute] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 365 U.S.
at 187. It is unclear, however, whether Monroe considered to what extent, if any, the defendant's
state of mind was relevant to liability under the statute. As one commentator has noted:
The phrases "background of tort liability" and "responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions" can be read to refer to different concepts within the law of torts. On the
one hand, "background of tort liability" can be interpreted to refer to the tort principle
of fault, where liability exists only for damages caused through the fault of the actor. On
the other hand, "responsible for the natural consequences of his actions" would appear
to refer to a standard of strict liability.
Comment, supra note 136, at 875.
The post-Monroe position of the lower federal courts on the state of mind requirement in
section 1983 cases has been varied. Some courts have applied a tort fault, or negligence, approach.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
Others have not required fault as a prerequisite to liability. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781,
787-88 (5th Cir. 1969). In addition, the pre-Monroe purposeful intent requirement may still enjoy
some support. See, e.g., Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 183 (S.D. Cal. 1964). For a
discussion of these various approaches, see Comment, supra note 136, at 876-81. It should be
noted that these approaches arose mainly in the context of the liability of public defendants under
section 1983.
The better position on this issue is the strict liability approach. A literal interpretation of the
statute's requirements would demand this result. More important, "[t]he strict liability approach
is the only alternative that satisfactorily complies with both of the theories of deterrence and
compensation" that underlie section 1983. Comment, supra note 136, at 885.
Recently, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, applied a strict liability standard to munici-
palities in section 1983 damages actions in denying them a qualified immunity based on the good
faith of their officials. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1409 (1980).
208. 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1339 (1980).
209. Id at 978, 983. See, e.g., Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970). See note 27
supra.
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against the private defendants as well. On appeal a Fifth Circuit panel
upheld the doctrine,210 but in an en banc rehearing it overruled its long
line of precedent and rejected derivative immunity for the private par-
ties.21
The majority opinion in the en banc Sparks decision began its
analysis by recognizing that the scope of judicial immunity "should not
be extended beyond that necessary to preserve the judge's indepen-
dence of mind and judgment, for it is upon the manifest necessity to
protect these, and on that alone, that the rule rests. ' 212 Moreover, the
court proceeded to declare "that no sound policy supports conferring
any ... immunity on private persons who persuade a judge to exer-
cise his jurisdiction corruptly. ' 213 The court in Sparks did not specify
the standard of liability it would apply to section 1983 private defend-
ants. The language quoted above, however, indicates that the court ap-
proved a strict liability standard. Furthermore, in discussing the
alleged conspiracy between the state judge and the private defendant,
the court noted: "Sound policy suggests that attempts by [private] per-
sons to subvert the judiciary should be penalized in every just way, civil
as well as criminal. It suggests that the fullest redress that the judicial
system can accommodate while functioning effectively should be
granted for such odious wrongs. '214
While the language of the statute indicates a strict liability stan-
dard,21 5 and although an argument for a good faith defense across the
board for private persons is not particularly convincing,216 there are
two instances in which something less than strict liability ought to be
applied to private parties acting in concert with state officials.217 Those
cases arise when private parties are simply obeying or are acting in
210. 588 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
211. 604 F.2d 976, 978, 983 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1339 (1980).
212. 604 F.2d at 980.
213. Id. (emphasis added). In particular, the court rejected the policy argument that, without
the derivative immunity doctrine, suits against private parties under section 1983 would result in
time-consuming collateral attacks against immune state actors. See notes 118-28 supra and ac-
companying text. "IT]he benefit that derivative immunity would accord in protecting judges from
an obligation to testify in the trial of their alleged co-conspirators, while not wholly illusory, is
comparatively insignificant." 604 F.2d at 980.
214. 604 F.2d at 980.
In Norton v. Liddel, No. 78-1712, slip op. at 7-8 (10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1980), the Tenth Circuit
also rejected the doctrine of derivative immunity. The court, however, did not indicate what stan-
dard of liability would apply to private defendants under section 1983, but merely held that when
the elements of section 1983 (state action and a constitutional deprivation) are pleaded and
proved, the statute may be employed against the private defendant. Id. at 6-7.
215. See notes 32 & 207 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 219-20 infra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 226-32 infra and accompanying text.
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reliance on state officials. In these instances, a sense of fairness and
public policy caution against adopting an inflexible rule that would
hold private parties strictly liable for their acts. 218
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
This Comment has attempted to demonstrate that the doctrine of
derivative immunity is unacceptable in evaluating the section 1983 lia-
bility of private persons who conspire with immune state officials. The
compromise solution of strict pleading suggested by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit is also unacceptable. Instead, the ap-
proach of the Courts of Appeals for the First and Fifth Circuits more
properly reflects the requirements of a valid section 1983 conspiracy
claim. Accepting these pleading requirements as legitimate and assum-
ing that a conspiracy can be proved, the problem that remains is
whether persons should, in all instances, be strictly liable for their ac-
tions taken in concert with state officials, immune or otherwise.
It has been suggested that private defendants in section 1983 ac-
tions should be given an across-the-board good faith defense.219 This
proposal, however, amounts to extending a qualified immunity to pri-
vate persons. Under the standards the Supreme Court has developed
for extending section 1983 immunity, private persons, as a general rule,
do not qualify.220
This Comment proposes that a sliding scale of liability be devel-
oped for private persons who act in concert with public officials. Under
this approach, private persons would be divided into three groups:
those who act on equal footing with state officials, those who act in
reliance on state officials, and those who act in obedience to state offi-
cials.221
218. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d at 16 (Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
The Tenth Circuit in Norton v. Liddel, No. 78-1712 (10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1980), recognized that
all classes of private parties would not fall under the same standard of liability. Although the
court did not expressly formulate this distinction, it specifically recognized a distinction between a
private party who actively conspires with an immune official and a private party who works with
and under an immune official. See id. slip op. at 14.
219. See "Vicarious Liability" 1038-39.
220. Nothing in the legislative history of section 1983 or the common law would permit the
extention of qualified immunity to private persons. In addition, private persons are not con-
fronted with the pressures of office, so there is no policy rationale for extending immunity to them.
For additional discussion, see notes 98-106 supra and accompanying text. Further, "Congress'
failure to require proof that a section 1983 defendant has intentionally violated the Constitution is
particularly strong evidence of its desire that such defendants should not be easily immunized."
Schnapper 241.
221. The question whether a private party acted on equal footing with, in reliance on, or in
obedience to a state official in every case should be .determined by the factfinder. The proposed
variable scale would establish the standard for liability once this question of fact has been re-
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A strict liability standard should apply to private persons who con-
spire on equal terms with state officials. This is the standard of liability
that applies to a state official absent any immunity defense and a literal
reading of section 1983 would command this result.222 The holding of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Price223 illustrates this standard.
In Price, the public and private defendants were engaged in a "joint
activity" and the Court held that they "must suffer the consequences of
that act." 224 The public defendants in Price made no claim of immu-
nity, but, as has been noted,225 the liability of the private party should
in no way be contingent on the fortuitous immunity of the public offi-
cial.
A negligence standard, however, should apply when the private
party has acted in reliance on a state official. In such a case, equity and
fairness dictate that the private party be held to a lesser standard of
liability-one closer to his standard of care in everyday life--even
though he was engaged in a conspiracy with the official. The negli-
gence standard is generally articulated in terms of what a "reasonable
person" would do in a similar situation. Nevertheless, the standard in-
volves four distinct considerations: the likelihood that the conduct
would cause injury, the magnitude of the possible injury, the impor-
tance of the goal toward which the conduct was directed, and the avail-
ability of alternative methods of achieving that goal.226
The facts in Sparkman suggest a situation in which the negligence
standard properly could be applied. 227 Plaintiff's mother approached a
state judge and received his approval of a sterilization petition without
any measure of due process. The private defendants in that case almost
certainly would not have acted were it not for the state judge's signa-
ture on the sterilization petition. If in fact a conspiracy existed, the
judge's immunity should not derivatively shield the private defendants.
Instead, their liability should depend on the four considerations that
comprise the negligence standard. Assuming that the plaintiff could
have proven a conspiracy had she been allowed to proceed to discovery
solved. Because strict liability is the general rule under section 1983, it is presumed that a defend-
ant's claim of reliance or obedience would be an affirmative defense with the burden on the
defendant to establish these facts at trial. The alternative would be to have the plaintiff allege and
establish the absence of reliance or obedience as an element of his prima facie case. Clearly,
establishing the existence of reliance or obedience is a less onerous burden for the defendant than
is the burden of the plaintiff to establish their nonexistence.
222. See note 207 supra.
223. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). See notes 5-6 supra.
224. 383 U.S. at 795.
225. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
226. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 31, at 145-49 (4th ed. 1971).
227. See notes 153-56 supra and accompanying text.
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and trial, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a jury might have found
this negligence standard breached.228
The final category of private parties in section 1983 conspiracies is
comprised of those who act in obedience to an immune state official. In
an obedience case, an official order (most likely a judicial order) is im-
posed on a private party. Unlike the reliance situation, the private
party has not approached the official seeking his assistance. For exam-
ple, if the surgeons in Sparkman had been ordered by the court to ster-
ilize the plaintiff, they would have been acting in obedience to, rather
than in reliance on, the state judge. In this setting, a bona fide argu-
ment exists for extending immunity to the private party.229 The justifi-
cation for a qualified immunity is twofold. First, the judicial, political,
and administrative processes would be disrupted if those responsible
for carrying out directives entertained doubts about the propriety of
their acts. Second, subjecting to liability those who act pursuant to offi-
cial orders while shielding those who issue the orders is manifestly un-
just.230
The immunity to be extended to the private defendant in obedi-
ence cases should be narrowly drawn. It may be argued that this im-
munity should parallel the immunity of the state official issuing the
orders. The better approach, however, would be to grant the private
defendant a qualified immunity, determined by objective and subjec-
tive good faith.23' Otherwise, a successful section 1983 conspiracy be-
228. There was no doubt that the defendants' conduct would cause injury. Sterilization is a
dramatic and grave injury. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation is
fundamental and "one of the basic civil rights of man"). While the goal of preventing the plaintiff
from becoming pregnant out of wedlock was arguably important, alternative methods of birth
control are so numerous and common that the sterilization operation suggests lack of due care.
229. Merely extending the negligence standard to persons acting in obedience to public offi-
cials would be underinclusive. It is possible that a party who has acted in good faith may have
also acted negligently. For example, in Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), the
negligent shooting of a youth by a police officer was held actionable under section 1983 even
though the shooting was unintentional. It should be noted that Jenkins was decided before the
nature of the qualified immunity test had been defined in Scheuer and Wood. See text accompa-
nying notes 60-63 supra.
230. Developments in the Law 1199-200 n.68; see Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d at 274 n.8
(Swygert, J., dissenting). Several courts have extended immunity to court-appointed psychiatrists.
See, e.g., Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
908 (1971).
231. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the good faith standard.
Theoretically, in many cases, extending qualified immunity to private defendants when they pur-
portedly have acted in obedience to a state official would be irrelevant to the outcome of a section
1983 action. If the private defendant, in good faith, acted in obedience to a state official, the state
action element would be absent, because a conspiracy could not be shown. The complaint, there-
fore, would fail to state a section 1983 claim against the private defendant and should be dis-
missed. This further illustrates the proposition that immunity for private parties under section
1983, as a general rule, is unnecessary. Extending a qualified immunity to the private defendant
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tween a judge and a private party framed in the context of a judicial
order would leave both defendants absolutely immune to suit. A stan-
dard of objective and subjective good faith, however, would foreclose
this not improbable scenario and at the same time shield the private
party honestly acting in obedience to the court or another official.
Initially, this three-tiered standard may appear cumbersome.
When attaching section 1983 liability to a private party alleged to have
conspired with public officials, however, the law should consider all the
circumstances in which the deprivation of the victim's rights took place.
It is only in this fashion that proper account can be taken of the inter-
ests of all the parties. "Any mechanical approach to § 1983 is flawed in
that it is unresponsive to such considerations as they vary in the indi-
vidual case, and the policy conscious § 1983 court will eschew reliance
on such rigid formulas. ' 232 The gross deficiences in the mechanical
formulas of derivative immunity and strict pleading point to the obvi-
ous need for a variable standard of liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Application of derivative immunity to private persons who con-
spire with immune state officials to deprive another person of a consti-
tutional right is not justifiable under section 1983. No court of appeals
opinion adopting or applying the derivative immunity doctrine has
provided a reasoned analysis to support its holding. A reading of the
statute itself does not indicate any grant of immunity. More important,
a careful analysis of the justifications advanced for the existing govern-
mental immunities demonstrates that they provide no rationale for ex-
tending immunity to private citizens. The policy arguments advanced
by proponents of the derivative immunity doctrine are equally unper-
suasive, amounting only to an after-the-fact attempt to preserve what
has become a precedential rule of law.
In addition, the theory of derivative immunity is itself analytically
unsound. The courts that follow the doctrine have confused the issues
of state action-a jurisdicitional predicate to a section 1983 cause of
action-and the immunity of the state official-an affirmative defense.
Furthermore, derivative immunity is a defense that attaches to a pri-
vate party as a result of fortuity, rather than as a result of the individual
acts of the private party. The strict pleading requirement suggested by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Sparkman is not a
in the obedience cases, however, would presumably alter the relative burdens of proving his in-
volvement in a conspiracy and more readily allow a showing of good faith to rebut circumstantial
evidence of a conspiracy.
232. Bristow, supra note 124, at 319.
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worthwhile compromise because it creates a needless cdnflict with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and suffers from many of the same
defects as the derivative immunity doctrine.
Not surprisingly, when the doctrine has been carefully analyzed, it
has been rejected. Recent decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits and a consistent line of cases in the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit have refused to adopt derivative immu-
nity. Instead, those courts have indicated that a private party who con-
spires with an immune public official to deprive another of a
constitutional right should be strictly liable.
At a minimum, the proposed classification system for private par-
ties in section 1983 actions helps to unravel the confusion that has
arisen in this area of section 1983 law. A private defendant who has
acted on an equal basis with a public official is certainly in a different
posture than one who has acted in reliance on or in obedience to that
official. A blanket rule cannot fairly cover all three situations.
Craig B. Merkie
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